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Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right:  
Reconsidering the Application of 
Comparative Fault to Punitive Damage 
Awards  
Victor E. Schwartz* & Christopher E. Appel**   
I. INTRODUCTION   
Every once in awhile a legal topic of great importance falls through the 
cracks of thoughtful case law discussion and scholarly literature, seemingly 
lost in the seismic shift of a major change in law.  When legislatures and 
courts transitioned en masse, beginning in the 1960s, to comparative fault 
regimes in order to more precisely compensate injured parties and allocate 
responsibility for a harm, one such casualty was how that shift in law would 
affect the imposition of punitive damages.1  This intersection between com-
parative fault principles and punitive damages received relatively sparse at-
tention, in part, because the law of punitive damages was also in a very dif-
ferent place at the time.2  In the mid-twentieth century, awards of punitive 
damages were both infrequent in occurrence and generally modest in 
amount.3  In certain contexts where a harm had not been committed inten-
  
 * Victor E. Schwartz is chairman of the Public Policy Group in the Washing-
ton, D.C. office of the law firm Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.  He coauthors the most 
widely-used torts casebook in the United States, PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S 
TORTS (12th ed. 2010), and authors COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 2010), a 
leading text on the subject.  Mr. Schwartz received his B.A. summa cum laude from 
Boston University and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University. 
 ** Christopher E. Appel is an associate in the Public Policy Group in the Wash-
ington, D.C. office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.  He received his B.S. from the 
University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Commerce and his J.D. from Wake For-
est University School of Law. 
 1. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 20.01, at 453 (5th 
ed. 2010) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE] (stating that if a court 
looked at “the interrelationship between the two issues [of comparative fault and 
punitive damages], it would have found a barren wasteland of analysis in existing 
case law”); see also Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 189 (1950) (discussing the evolution of the comparative fault doctrine). 
 2. See SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.01, at 453 
(“At the same time that comparative negligence has become the prevailing rule in the 
United States, the rule allowing punitive damages for certain kinds of conduct has 
undergone reexamination and change.”). 
 3. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages were ‘rarely 
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tionally, such as in products liability or professional malpractice, these 
awards would have been “unthinkable.”4  Courts, therefore, had little occa-
sion to focus on whether and how their state’s newly adopted comparative 
fault system would affect an award of punitive damages.5  State legislature’s 
enacting comparative fault systems also glossed-over this issue, if it was even 
identified as an issue at all.6 
The result of this early oversight is that the intersection of comparative 
fault and punitive damages has, for decades, not received its due attention.  
Courts have generally, and almost mechanically, not permitted any adjust-
ment of punitive damages based on the comparative fault of another.7  When 
courts have considered this specific issue, they have often provided little 
analysis, deferring to the “way it has always been” under contributory negli-
gence where the prevailing party received the entire punitive damage award.8  
But this “all or nothing” approach is precisely why a contributory negligence 
system no longer exists in the vast majority of states; it risks unfairness to 
parties on either side – i.e. plaintiffs may receive too much or nothing at all 
from a defendant for their injury and defendants may pay too much or noth-
ing at all for harm they have caused.9    
The purpose of this Article is to reexamine and appropriately analyze 
the application of comparative fault to punitive damages.  The Article chal-
  
assessed’ and usually ‘small in amount.’”) (citations omitted); RICHARD L. BLATT ET 
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2, at 5 
(1991) (“[G]enerally before 1955, even if punitive damages were awarded, the size of 
the punitive damage award in relation to the compensatory damage award was rela-
tively small, as even nominal punitive damages were considered to be punishment in 
and of themselves.”); see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 4. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.04, at 459.  
 5. See id. § 20.01, at 453. 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. See SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.04, at 457; 
Francis M. Dougherty, Effect of Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence in Reducing 
Punitive Damages Recoverable, 27 A.L.R. 4th 318 (1984); see also infra Part II.A. 
 8. See, e.g., Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653, 659 
(Mont. 1981) (“[P]unitive damages cannot be reduced by the percentage of plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence.”); Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982) (same); Turner v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987) (same); see also infra Part II.A. 
 9. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (“The change to a 
comparative-negligence system eliminated the ‘all or nothing’ approach to tort recov-
ery in favor of apportionment of liability among all parties to an action in rough 
equivalence to their causal fault.” (citing W. PAGE KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & 
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 468-71 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS])); cf. Guido Calabresi & 
Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 868-72 
(1996) (noting a deep change in tort law compensation from “all-or-nothing to split-
ting” of fault). 
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lenges the conventional wisdom that these spheres of law should remain sepa-
rate.  Part II begins with an overview of the development of the law of com-
parative fault with punitive damages.  It discusses the limited attention that 
has been paid to potential overlap in these areas of law and draws parallels 
with other developments in the law of comparative fault supporting more 
accurate and just awards of damages.  Part III analyzes the public policy ar-
guments for and against applying comparative fault principles to punitive 
damage awards.  Finally, Part IV proposes practical methods of incorporating 
comparative fault principles into awards of punitive damages to provide more 
just awards.    
The Article concludes that where punitive damages are awarded, and 
especially where they are based upon unintentional conduct, comparative 
fault principles should apply in jurisdictions that have legislatively or judi-
cially adopted such a system.  The Article identifies and endorses several 
ways courts could implement such an approach.  While courts have tradition-
ally not been receptive to the idea of applying comparative fault to punitive 
awards the same way as with economic and noneconomic awards, this Article 
examines how the same fairness considerations apply.  
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT WITH 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
A.  Existing Legal Landscape 
Courts have paid relatively scarce attention to whether comparative fault 
principles may apply to reduce an award of punitive damages.10  A recurring 
observation of the few courts and legal commentators that have reviewed this 
area of law is that “[c]ommentary on this subject is limited.”11  Where spe-
cifically addressed in judicial decisions, the analysis has been equally lim-
ited.12  Courts often have dispensed with the notion of applying comparative 
fault to reduce a punitive award through nothing more than a sentence restat-
ing the general proposition that it ought not to be done.13   
Even in those decisions giving greater attention to this question, the 
conclusion has frequently been based on the generalized notion that because 
punitive damages serve a different purpose from compensatory damages – 
  
 10. See SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.01, at 453. 
 11. Clark v. Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d 605, 610 n.5 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
 12. See Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Fault and Punitive Damages – Balanc-
ing the Equities, They Must Intersect, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 125, 127 (1992) 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Comparative Fault and Punitive Damages] (noting that “few 
[courts] have devoted more than a paragraph of analysis to the interaction” and that 
there is “an [a]lmost [b]lank [s]late of [a]nalysis”). 
 13. See, e.g., Comeau, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (“We note only that punitive dam-
ages are not subject to apportionment.”). 
3
Schwartz and Appel: Schwartz: Two Wrongs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: SchwartzAppelPaginated.doc Created on:  10/21/13 9:40 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
136 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
punishment and deterrence as opposed to compensating for a harm14 – their 
treatment under comparative fault principles must necessarily be separate.15  
Accordingly, the majority of courts that have considered, at any level of anal-
ysis, the application of comparative fault principles to punitive damage 
awards have declined to recognize an intersection between the two areas of 
law.16   
The precise means by which courts have rejected such apportionment of 
fault have varied.17  For instance, some courts have not focused specifically 
on applying comparative fault principles to punitive damages, but rather 
whether a state’s comparative negligence statute applies to intentional acts for 
which punitive recovery could be implicated.18  Punitive damages, however, 
may be awarded for more than just intentional acts, which strains these 
courts’ analyses.  Punitive damages are sometimes available where an inten-
tional act has been committed, but may also be available in cases of negli-
gence (often as a “gross negligence” standard) or recklessness.19  Neverthe-
  
 14. See BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.”). 
 15. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. 
 16. See HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 7.5, at 165 (3d. 
ed. 1996) (stating that the majority of jurisdictions will not apportion punitive dam-
ages award according to comparative fault principles); David W. Leebron, An 
Introduction to Products Liability: Origins, Issues and Trends, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 395, 450 n.272 (1991) (“[C]ourts have split on whether such punitive damages are 
reduced by plaintiff’s comparative fault.”).  For case examples, see Friley v. Int’l 
Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 126, 126 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & 
Webster Eng’g Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Hondo’s Truck Stop 
Cafe, Inc. v. Clemmons, 716 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Danculovich v. 
Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193-94 (Wyo. 1979); see also supra note 8 and accompanying 
text. 
 17. As the Kansas Supreme Court in Bowman v. Doherty explained: 
From a review of the cases of states which 
have addressed this issue, various approaches 
to this question emerge.  Some states, relying 
on the essential difference between wanton 
conduct and negligence refuse to allow any 
damages, actual or exemplary, to be reduced 
by comparative fault.  Other courts refuse to 
apportion punitive damage awards, keeping in-
tact the policy of punishing wanton or inten-
tional acts. 
686 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1984). 
 18. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (“intentional misconduct or gross negligence”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 41.003(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (“gross negligence”); 
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less, some courts have used the application of comparative fault principles to 
intentional acts as the predicate for broadly rejecting comparative fault where 
punitive damages could be at issue in contexts involving unintentional acts.   
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Blazovic v. Andrich,20 
held that although the state’s Comparative Negligence Act extends beyond 
ordinary negligence actions to include intentional torts, it does not apply to 
allow comparative fault apportionment of punitive damages for any type of 
act.21  Interestingly, the court rejected “the concept that intentional conduct is 
‘different in kind’ from both negligence and wanton and willful conduct” for 
the purpose of applying apportionment principles, reasoning that “consistent 
with the evolution of comparative negligence and joint-tortfeasor liability in 
this state, we hold that responsibility for a plaintiff’s claimed injury is to be 
apportioned according to each party’s relative degree of fault, including the 
fault attributable to an intentional tortfeasor.”22  But, the court continued, 
“[w]here tortious conduct merits punitive as well as compensatory damages, a 
plaintiff’s comparative fault will reduce recovery only of compensatory dam-
ages.”23  Thus, the court adopted the unique position of permitting appor-
tionment of compensatory damages for intentional torts, yet denying appor-
tionment from ever applying to reduce an award of punitive damages, even if 
pursuant to a less culpable unintended act.24   
Other courts have more directly addressed the application of compara-
tive fault principles to punitive damages.  Instead of distinguishing intentional 
acts from the scope of comparative negligence statutes, these courts have 
looked to the specific purpose of punitive damages as compared with com-
pensatory damages.  For example, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Godberson v. 
Miller,25 interpreted the state’s statutory comparative fault scheme to find that 
punitive damages were not subject to comparative fault because “punitive 
damages are designed to exact a penalty from the defendant for conduct that 
  
Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168, 173 (Kan. 1988) (“gross negligence”); Seals v. St. 
Regis Paper Co., 236 So. 2d 388, 392 (Miss. 1970) (gross negligence and “reckless 
indifference to the consequences”); Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ohio 
1978) (“caused by intentional, reckless, wanton, willful and gross acts or by malice 
inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.02, at 
454-55 (discussing transition from punitive damages being awarded for intentional 
conduct to less culpable conduct); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive 
Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1130-38 
(1984) (discussing standards of conduct giving rise to punitive damages award). 
 20. 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991). 
 21. See id. at 231-32. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 231. 
 24. See id. at 231-32. 
 25. 439 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1989). 
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is grossly negligent, wanton, willful or reckless.”26  Here, the defendant ar-
gued that the comparative fault statute’s definition of “fault” as an act “in any 
measure negligent or reckless” should apply to punitive damages arising from 
such conduct.27  While the court noted that the defendant’s argument “carries 
a certain technical appeal,” it nevertheless reasoned that “[p]unishment, not 
compensation, is the goal” of punitive damages and the goal of the statute 
was “proportional compensation, not punishment.”28 
The Kansas Supreme Court reached a similar result in Bowman v. Do-
herty.29  Here, the court declined to reduce a $900 punitive damage award 
resulting from legal malpractice after the trial court reduced the actual com-
pensatory award of $100 by half to account for the plaintiff’s negligence 
(30%) and that of an assistant district attorney (20%).30  The result, therefore, 
was that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages owed by the 
defendant went from nine-to-one to eighteen-to-one following the application 
of comparative fault to only the compensatory award.31  The court explained 
its decision not to apply comparative fault to the punitive award because “[a]n 
award of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer, not to compensate for 
the wrong.”32  The court reasoned that because these “[c]onsiderations are 
different,” it therefore followed that “[p]unitive damages and comparative 
fault are separate” and do not intersect.33 
The majority of other courts specifically deciding whether comparative 
fault principles may apply to a punitive damage award have adhered to this 
same basic rationale.34  Some other courts, however, have expressly declined 
to decide this issue so as to avoid the risk of painting with too broad of a 
brushstroke.35  Still others have declined to address the issue because the par-
ties failed to identify that it was an issue to be considered.36 
  
 26. Id. at 208; see also Reimers v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 
1990). 
 27. Godbersen, 439 N.W.2d at 208. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 686 P.2d 112, 122 (Kan. 1984). 
 30. See id. at 117, 122. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 122. 
 33. Id.  But see Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 248 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that “where tort liability is predicated on conduct less 
culpable than ‘intentional’ the general rule is to compare fault and causation”). 
 34. See, e.g., Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 27 P.3d 1092, 1099 (Or. Ct. App. 
2001), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 974 (2003); Tucker v. Marcus, 418 
N.W.2d 818, 828 (Wis. 1988); supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 35. See, e.g., Downing v. United Auto Racing Ass’n, 570 N.E.2d 828, 843 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (“We note that the jury in the instant cause awarded only compensa-
tory damages, and we express no opinion with respect to whether comparative fault 
principles apply to a plaintiff’s award for punitive damages.”), abrogated by Burke v. 
12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1992); Dunn v. Ill. Cent. Gulf 
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On the opposite end of the spectrum are a handful of cases that have ap-
plied comparative fault principles to reduce a punitive damages award.37  
Significantly, this body of case law has supported the intersection of com-
parative fault with punitive damages under both common law and a state’s 
statutory comparative fault regime.  For instance, the Nevada Supreme Court 
in Wilson v. Pacific Maxon, Inc.,38 affirmed a trial court’s award of punitive 
damages that had been reduced by the opposing party’s comparative fault.39  
The case involved competing claims arising from the sale of a business and 
its eventual return to the seller following the buyer’s default.40  The trial court 
awarded the seller $10,000 in punitive damages for the “willful and malicious 
removal of property” and related property damage while the property was 
briefly in the buyer’s possession.41  The trial court stated that the “[punitive] 
damages would have been more substantial,” but the fact that the seller mis-
represented the value of the business by altering the initial appraisal report 
functioned to reduce the punitive award.42   
On appeal, the state high court explained that, “[Seller] primarily argues 
that with regard to punitive damages our stated policies ‘to punish the wrong-
doer . . . and to deter others from acting in similar fashion,’ would be of-
fended if punitive damages were subject to reduction by reason of any fault of 
the injured party.”43  The court flatly rejected this argument.44  Instead, it 
provided a more measured and flexible approach, holding “the trier of fact, in 
assessing punitive damages, may consider ‘all the circumstances attending the 
particular transaction involved, including any mitigating circumstances which 
may operate to reduce without wholly defeating such damages.’”45   
  
R.R., 574 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“In passing upon plaintiff’s cross-
appeal, we need not consider plaintiff’s contention that any reduction in the punitive 
damages award on comparative fault principles is contrary to public policy as we have 
determined no punitive damages award should have been made.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Niver v. Travelers Indem. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d 968, 994 (N.D. 
Iowa 2006) (“Niver asserts that comparative fault principles have no application to 
punitive damages.  Travelers apparently agrees, because it states that it will not pre-
sent any evidence regarding comparative fault.”).   
 37. See Leebron, supra note 16, at 450, 450 n.272 (noting the “split” among 
courts on apportionment of punitive damages is based on a plaintiff’s comparative 
fault). 
 38. 686 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1984) (per curiam), abrogated by Ace Truck & Equip. 
Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 746 P.2d 132 (Nev. 1987), and modified by, 714 P.2d 1001 
(Nev. 1986). 
 39. See id. at 237. 
 40. See id. at 236. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 237. 
 43. Id. (quoting Bader v. Cerri, 609 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1980)). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. (quoting Hannahs v. Noah, 158 N.W.2d 678, 683 (S.D. 1968)). 
7
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The Colorado Supreme Court, in Lira v. Davis,46 similarly permitted the 
application of comparative fault principles when “consider[ing] the interrela-
tionship of the comparative negligence, the pro rata liability, and the exem-
plary damages statutes” in the state.47  This case arose out of an automobile 
accident in which the trial court apportioned fault among five parties, and 
reduced a punitive damages award against one party who was found 50% 
responsible for the accident by 50%.48  The Colorado Court of Appeals re-
versed this decision, finding that exemplary damages awards could not be 
reduced by the plaintiff’s comparative negligence.49  The state supreme court, 
sitting en banc, considered this precise issue and reversed the court of ap-
peals’ ruling.50  The Colorado Supreme Court held that while comparative 
negligence did not apply directly to reduce a punitive damages award, the 
state’s statute setting forth a one-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages applied to reduce any punitive damages award to the amount of 
compensatory damages reduced through the application of comparative 
fault.51  Thus, in the instant case, the result was the same as if comparative 
fault had been applied to directly reduce the punitive damage award.52   
In Parr v. Central Soya Co.,53 a federal district court in Michigan upheld 
the application of comparative fault principles to an award of exemplary 
damages when examining the issue under both common law and statutory 
authority.  In noting that “Michigan has adopted comparative negligence both 
judicially and legislatively,” the court engaged in a careful analysis of Michi-
gan law and the law in “sister jurisdictions” around the country to determine 
if an award of exemplary damages arising from a defective product could be 
reduced by the application of comparative fault.54  The court reasoned that 
because the Michigan Supreme Court had stated unequivocally that “‘com-
parative negligence should be applied in all common-law tort actions sound-
ing in negligence where the defendant’s misconduct falls short of being inten-
tional,’” allowing the application of comparative fault would “comport[] with 
the policies underlying adoption of pure comparative negligence.”55  In addi-
tion, the court found “unpersuasive” the authority of other jurisdictions deny-
ing the application of comparative fault principles, holding instead that be-
  
 46. 832 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). 
 47. Id. at 241. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. at 246. 
 51. See id. at 243-46. 
 52. See id. at 244.  The high court stated that the result of the case, whereby the 
final punitive damage award was the same as if comparative fault applied directly to 
reduce the award, would be different given other fact patterns.  See id. at 244 n.5. 
 53. 732 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
 54. Id. at 742, 743 n.3. 
 55. Id. at 743 (quoting Vining v. City of Detroit, 413 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1987)). 
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cause exemplary damage awards in Michigan are, in part, intended “to com-
pensate plaintiffs for injuries,” it followed that consideration of comparative 
fault was part of that calculation.56  
Other courts have reached similar results.57  Often they have done so 
without focusing on the precise question of whether comparative fault applies 
directly to a punitive damage award, but rather whether the proper considera-
tion of comparative fault for compensatory awards necessarily requires reas-
sessment of punitive damages.58  For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
in Shields v. Cape Fox Corp.,59 broadly held that it was reversible error to not 
include a comparative fault instruction for claims arising from an alleged 
breach of a fiduciary duty.60  There, the trial court awarded $300,000 in puni-
tive damages against several defendants in relation to such alleged miscon-
duct.61  In reversing and vacating the decision, the state’s high court stated 
that “[b]ecause comparative fault is relevant to punitive damages, a new trial 
as to [plaintiff’s] entitlement to punitive damages and the amount of punitive 
damages is also required.”62   
On other occasions, courts have directly applied comparative fault prin-
ciples to punitive awards without expressly recognizing or explaining such 
application.63  At other times, courts keenly aware of the implications of 
  
 56. Id. at 743 n.3. 
 57. See, e.g., Haskell v. Tan World, Inc., No. LACV041637, 2003 WL 
24054815, at *1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2003) (“If Plaintiff’s negligence were relevant 
in the awarding of punitive damages, comparative fault would apply to punitive dam-
ages.”); Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Schulz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1979) (upholding reduction of punitive damages award by percentage of plain-
tiffs’ negligence); see also Leebron, supra note 16, at 450; Dougherty, supra note 7, § 
1. 
 58. See, e.g., Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), No. SA CV 01–
971 DOC, 2003 WL 21530096, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2003) (noting trial court 
reduced compensatory damages to approximately $5 million based on comparative 
fault and granted a motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages); Watts v. 
Ferrellgas, L.P., No. B182060, 2006 WL 903709, *5 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 
2006) (“Needless to say, the trial court’s erroneous summary adjudication ruling, 
along with its decision to remove the issue of comparative fault from the jury, compel 
retrial not only on liability but also on the issues of compensatory damages and puni-
tive damages.”) (emphasis added). 
 59. 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002). 
 60. See id. at 1088-90. 
 61. See id. at 1085. 
 62. Id. at 1092. 
 63. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So. 3d 307, 310 n.2 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court ordered 
the reduction because it found the $80 million award excessive and a $40.8 million 
award appropriate; rather, it appears the reduction was simply the result of a mathe-
matical calculation by the trial court based on the comparative fault percentage found 
by the jury: $80 million x 51% = $40.8 million”); Cotter v. Miller, 54 S.W.3d 691, 
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whether, and, if so, how comparative fault may apply directly to punitive 
damage awards have specifically opted to leave the issue open for determina-
tion at a later time.64   
These examples reveal that while the majority of courts that have con-
sidered whether comparative fault should apply to awards of punitive dam-
ages have declined to recognize an intersection, there exists a significant mi-
nority endorsing the practice.  In any event, as explained above, the precise 
issue has not yet received the degree of treatment and analysis by courts nec-
essary to form a clear consensus as to whether an intersection should be rec-
ognized.  As the next section explains, there are other signs in the develop-
ment of comparative fault principles and tort law generally that may lead 
courts to take up or reassess how apportionment might be applied to more 
justly award punitive damages.    
B.  Evolutionary Signs 
A clear trend in the development of comparative fault principles has 
been to more carefully parse wrongful conduct among parties and match that 
conduct to liability and an ultimate award of damages.  Indeed, the core con-
cept underlying the widespread change by states from contributory negli-
gence to comparative fault systems was to more carefully tie each parties’ 
actions to their respective liability, and avoid blunt “all or nothing” rules pre-
cluding recovery where a plaintiff was even marginally to blame for his or 
her injury.65  This trend towards greater precision in liability and damages has 
continued under modern comparative fault systems.  Two ways this has oc-
curred include the application of comparative fault among negligent and in-
tentional tortfeasors and the application of comparative fault among multiple 
tortfeasors where punitive damages are awarded.      
  
695 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (noting “[t]he trial court indicated in its order that it 
intended to apply the percentages of comparative fault to the punitive damages (ag-
gravating circumstances) portion of the case” and declining to disturb that holding); 
Ali v. Fisher, No. E2003–00255–COA–R3–CV, 2003 WL 22046673, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 29, 2003) (jury awarded  $25,000 in punitive damages and allocated based 
on comparative fault of two defendants; $20,000 to one found 80% responsible and 
$5,000 to another found 20% responsible for plaintiff’s injury), aff’d, 145 S.W.3d 557 
(Tenn. 2004); see also Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 
881 (W.Va. 2010) (reducing total punitive damage award by 40% following court’s 
determination that punitive damages were not available for medical monitoring award 
that made up 40% of total award). 
 64. See, e.g., Arch Chemicals, Inc. v. Radiator Specialty Co., No. 07–1339–HU, 
2011 WL 597042, at *3 (D. Or. 2011) (analyzing Oregon Supreme Court precedent to 
conclude that “the question of an apportionment for fault leading to liability for puni-
tive damages remains”). 
 65. See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 9, at 868-72. 
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1.  Comparative Fault Applied Among Negligent and Intentional Tort-
feasors 
Perhaps the most encouraging development with regard to providing fair 
and efficient compensation to injured parties, whether for punitive damages 
or other types of damages, is the decision by some state high courts and legis-
latures to apply comparative fault to both negligent and intentional tortfea-
sors.66  Stated plainly, this means that in cases where multiple parties have 
caused an injury, and at least one acted intentionally in doing so, the court 
will compare the fault of the intentional and negligent tortfeasors and allocate 
damages among them as opposed to holding the intentional tortfeasor respon-
sible for the entire injury.  Consequently, the intentional tortfeasor is not pun-
ished by having to overcompensate an injured party, and a negligent tortfea-
sor cannot escape responsibility for his or her negligent act.  Courts, there-
fore, view the wrongful conduct as “different in degree,” not “different in 
kind” such that the conduct should be treated separately, and can weigh the 
egregiousness of each parties’ conduct when apportioning damages.67   
The aforementioned Blazovic case presents an example of such a devel-
opment in the law, even though the court stopped short of applying compara-
tive fault principles to punitive awards and produced the somewhat inconsis-
tent result of applying comparative fault to compensatory awards arising from 
intentional acts but rejecting comparative fault for punitive awards arising 
from potentially unintentional acts.68  Nevertheless, the case illustrates how 
courts have, at least with regard to compensatory awards, broadly construed 
comparative fault principles to reach more exacting determinations of dam-
ages.   
A number of other courts have adopted this approach.69  For example, in 
2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held that the 
  
 66. See Hilsmeier v. Chapman, 192 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Ky. 2006); Reichert v. 
Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 381 (N.M. 1994); Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1079 (Utah 
1998); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs ex rel. Teton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept. v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 
1079, 1083 (Wyo. 2000). 
 67. Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231-32 (N.J. 1991); see also Robbins v. 
McCarthy, 581 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“Like the issues created by a 
comparative analysis of fault, the issues produced by the punitive damages concept 
are inherently issues of degree; for example, was the defendant’s conduct slightly 
negligent, negligent, very negligent, grossly negligent, wanton or heedless?”). 
 68. See Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 231-32. 
 69. See, e.g., Harvey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 983 P.2d 34, 39 (Colo. App. 1998); 
Specialized Commercial Lending, Inc. v. Murphy-Blossman Appraisal Servs. Inc., 
978 So. 2d 927, 938-39 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A]pplication of Louisiana’s pure com-
parative fault system requires that the fault of both negligent and intentional tortfea-
sors be assessed by the factfinder”); Reichert, 875 P.2d at 382-83 (holding a tavern 
owner’s negligent failure to protect patrons from foreseeable harm may be compared 
to the intentional conduct of another tortfeasor); Field, 952 P.2d at 1080 (holding that 
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state’s General Assembly was “unambiguous” in its intent to have “compara-
tive fault principles apply equally to negligent and intentional [torts].”70  Sim-
ilarly, in 2000, the Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted its comparative fault 
statute to include “willful and wanton or intentional” acts to be compared 
with negligent tortfeasors.71  While this approach remains the minority view 
across the country,72 such decisions, by both courts and state legislatures, 
illustrate that this area of law is by no means settled; it continues to evolve in 
a manner allowing more precise consideration of a party’s proportionate fault, 
regardless of its degree. 
2.  Comparative Fault Applied to Punitive Damage Awards of Multiple 
Tortfeasors 
A second development or “sign” of changing attitudes to how compara-
tive fault principles have traditionally applied relates to apportionment of 
punitive damage awards where these damages are awarded against multiple 
tortfeasors.73  In such cases, courts have traditionally applied joint liability so 
that punitive damages could be sought from any of the tortfeasors.  Most 
states now, however, have abolished or modified joint liability – an earlier 
  
“fault” as contained in Utah’s comparative fault scheme included intentional acts).  
But see Le v. Nitetown, Inc., 72 So. 3d 374, 378-79 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (precluding 
comparative fault statute from applying to reduce nightclub patrons’ damages awards 
against nightclub, even though patron was found twenty per cent at fault for his inju-
ries, where jury found nightclub’s bouncers used excessive force against patrons and 
committed intentional act); Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 87-88 
(Tenn. 2001) (where harm arises from the tortious acts of an intentional tortfeasor as a 
result of a foreseeable risk created by a negligent defendant, each tortious actor is 
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's damages). 
 70. Hilsmeier, 192 S.W.3d at 344-45. 
 71. Bassett, 8 P.3d at 1083. 
 72. See Allan L. Schwartz, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Principles 
to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R. 5th 525, § 2a (1994). 
 73. As the Maryland Court of Appeals in Embrey v. Holly explained:  
Many states . . . have adopted the rule that pu-
nitive damages may be apportioned between 
wrongdoers either by providing varying 
amounts of such awards or by levying exem-
plary damages against some of the defendants 
but not others.  In our view, this is the most 
sensible approach to the subject, for punitive 
damages, in order to be fair and effective, must 
relate to the degree of culpability exhibited by 
a particular defendant . . . . Punitive damages, 
in essence, represent a civil fine, and as such, 
should be imposed on an individual basis. 
442 A.2d 966, 973 (Md. 1982). 
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evolutionary step towards more just damage awards – so that parties are gen-
erally limited to the maximum harm individually caused, or caused when 
acting in concert with others.74  But courts are “widely divided” when it 
comes to whether, in an action against joint or multiple tortfeasors, punitive 
or exemplary damages may be apportioned among the defendants.75 
A growing number of courts have held that punitive damages may be 
apportioned among joint or multiple tortfeasors “depending upon the differ-
ing degree of culpability or the existence or nonexistence of actual malice on 
the part of the defendants.”76  This more flexible, modern approach allows a 
court to consider varying levels of culpability, while avoiding the harsh result 
in the case of joint liability of allowing a plaintiff to collect the total punitive 
damages award from a defendant whose conduct only amounted to reckless-
ness amidst a field of intentional actors.77  Interestingly, courts have also al-
lowed such apportionment of punitive damages even where the compensatory 
award was not subject to apportionment.78   
These gradual shifts in how comparative fault principles have been ap-
plied in the time since the vast majority of states abandoned a contributory 
  
 74. According to one survey of state joint and several liability laws: 
[A] majority of states have abolished or modi-
fied the traditional doctrine of joint liability. 
Eighteen states have abolished joint liability 
and replaced it with pure several liability, un-
der which each defendant is liable for its pro-
portionate share of fault for the harm. Four 
states have eliminated joint liability for none-
conomic damages. Fourteen states have 
abolished joint liability in cases where the de-
fendant’s comparative responsibility is below 
some threshold level. Some states provide 
other limits on joint liability. Nine states and 
the District of Columbia have yet to generally 
abolish or modify their joint liability rules. 
Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Jus-
tice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1148-50 (2005) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 75. See D. E. Ytreberg, Apportionment of Punitive or Exemplary Damages as 
Between Joint Tortfeasors, 20 A.L.R. 3d 666, § 2 (1968); see also Note, Apportion-
ment of Punitive Damages, 38 VA. L. REV. 71, 72 (1952). 
 76. Ytreberg, supra note 75, at § 2; see also Cheek v. J.B.G. Props., Inc., 344 
A.2d 180, 190 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (“Those jurisdictions favoring apportion-
ment seem to rely on the reasonable view that a jury should be permitted to vary the 
damages depending upon the degree of culpability since punitive or exemplary dam-
ages are not compensation for injury; instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”). 
 77. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796, 797-98 (W.D. Mo. 
1965). 
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negligence system illustrate a trend towards greater flexibility in pinpointing 
the correct amount of recovery – both compensatory and punitive – against 
tortfeasors.  Juxtaposing the current state of law regarding the application of 
comparative fault principles to punitive damage awards, there is an avenue 
for this trend to develop further.  As the next section explains, there are sound 
public policy rationales for endorsing the minority approach across the coun-
try and applying comparative fault principles to punitive damage awards.    
III.  PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLYING COMPARATIVE 
FAULT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
The decision of whether to apply comparative fault principles to an 
award of punitive damages is, at bottom, primarily one of policy.  Courts 
have discretion in interpreting the intent and scope of comparative fault stat-
utes and in developing the common law, and, as explained in the previous 
section, have exercised that discretion on a number of occasions.79  This sec-
tion examines the policy considerations for and against applying comparative 
fault to punitive damage awards to determine the soundest approach for the 
future development of tort law.   
A.  Responding to Policy Arguments Against Applying Comparative 
Fault to Punitive Damage Awards 
The most often cited policy argument against applying comparative fault 
to punitive damage awards is that it is akin to comparing apples and oranges: 
comparative fault regimes are designed to calculate the appropriate amount of 
compensatory recovery for a wrongful harm caused by another, and punitive 
damages exist on an entirely separate plane designed to provide punishment 
for the reprehensibility of the harm caused and deter its future occurrence.80  
On first glance, this view holds some superficial appeal.  The modern pur-
poses behind compensatory damages and punitive damages are indeed differ-
ent.81  But the deeper question is whether that difference in purpose over-
comes the more fundamental objective of the tort system to properly “right a 
  
 79. See supra Part II.A. 
 80. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text; cf. J. Tayler Fox, Note, Can 
Apples Be Compared to Oranges? A Policy-Based Approach for Deciding Whether 
Intentional Torts Should Be Included in Comparative Fault Analysis, 43 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 261, 294 (2008) (examining the application of comparative fault principles to 
intentional torts and arguing that intentional torts should not be included in states’ 
comparative fault schemes). 
 81. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  But see infra notes 131-33 and 
accompanying text. 
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wrong”;82 an objective that sometimes necessitates an award of punitive dam-
ages to accomplish.83  
Courts rejecting any application of comparative fault to punitive damage 
awards have often began and ended their analysis with such an apples to or-
anges justification.84  They have not considered whether, despite distinct pur-
poses, intersection would achieve the larger objectives of greater fairness and 
justice to the parties and prevention of disproportionate punitive damage 
awards.85  Only a few courts have endeavored to scratch beneath the surface.  
Of them, the South Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Cantrell v. Clark 
provides one of the more thoughtful discussions.86  Here, the court affirmed a 
trial court’s decision not to apportion punitive damages according to com-
parative fault principles in an action arising out of a fatal automobile acci-
dent.  A jury found the defendant Cantrell 84% at fault for the accident, and 
liable for actual and punitive damages totaling $78,000 and $25,750 respec-
tively.87  On appeal, Cantrell argued that “because punitive damages have a 
compensatory component in South Carolina, they should bear a reasonable 
relationship to the plaintiff’s conduct and should be reduced by the amount of 
the plaintiff’s negligence.”88 
While the court began with the familiar argument that the purposes of 
punitive damages and compensatory damages are distinct, it did not immedi-
ately end its analysis there.  Instead, the court acknowledged that after the 
South Carolina Supreme Court judicially adopted comparative negligence, 
the court of appeals had “re-examined several traditional tort doctrines” to see 
how they might be affected.89  The court also recognized that “punitive dam-
ages have received increasing academic criticism in recent years” and calls 
  
 82. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 14-15 (2000); VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
1–2 (11th ed. 2005) [hereinafter PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS]. See gen-
erally John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 315 (1894). 
 83. See DOBBS, supra note 82, § 381, at 1062 (2000) (“Because punishment does 
not adequately describe the bases for [punitive] damages, they are sometimes called 
extracompensatory damages.”). 
 84. See supra Part II.A. 
 85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 cmt. a 
(2000) (“Comparative responsibility has a potential impact on almost all areas of tort 
law.”). 
 86. 504 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (S.C. 1998); see also Virginia Garner Shelley, Clark 
v. Cantrell: A Windfall for Negligent Plaintiffs or Preserving the Goals of Punitive 
Damages?, 52 S.C. L. REV. 427, 436-37 (2001). 
 87. Clark, 504 S.E.2d at 608.  The defendant Cantrell was found to have ex-
ceeded the posted 35 mile per hour speed limit while driving with her hazard lights 
on, purportedly because her gas tank was near empty.  See id. at 608-09. 
 88. Id. at 609. 
 89. Id. 
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for reform.90   Nevertheless, it maintained that “not every tort concept is af-
fected by the adoption of comparative negligence.”91  The court further rec-
ognized that the broader purpose of punitive damages in the state is to “vindi-
cate[] a private right,” and that “several cases conclude this vindicative qual-
ity adds a compensatory purpose.”92  The court even pointed to three other 
state jurisdictions where “punitive damages are awarded primarily to com-
pensate and incidentally to punish” to support the proposition that punitive 
damages may also serve a compensatory function.93  Finally, the court stated 
that although case law precedent “does not require juries to expressly appor-
tion punitive damages,” they may “consider many factors in determining 
whether to award punitive damages.”94 
However, despite these considerations, the court concluded that the 
“compensatory purpose served by punitive damages is merely incidental” and 
the separate purposes of punitive and compensatory damages justified no 
reduction of the punitive damages award.95  In reaching this decision, the 
court expressed its view that the defendant’s conduct in causing the fatal ac-
cident and showing a lack of remorse was especially “reckless, willful, wan-
ton, [and] malicious.”96  The court, therefore, held that the full amount of 
punitive damages awarded by the trial court was warranted to adequately 
deter such conduct in the future.97 
While Cantrell provided a more comprehensive analysis of competing 
policy considerations, it still reached the same conclusion that the distinct 
purposes of punitive and compensatory damages nullify potential intersection 
of comparative fault and a punitive award.  The core issue not squarely ad-
dressed is whether, and how, the punishment meted out was proportionate to 
the harm caused or whether there was over-punishment.  For example, in the 
Cantrell case, was the defendant who was 84% liable for the harm over-
punished by a punitive damage award 16% higher than necessary to serve the 
punitive function?  Such a question may be difficult to answer, especially in 
light of the volatility and subjective nature of punitive awards.98  However, 
that does not mean it should not be answered where a finder of fact has heard 
all of the evidence and made a determination of the full amount of compensa-
tory and punitive damages. 
Such fairness considerations also take on increased significance when a 
plaintiff has engaged in grossly negligent or reckless conduct that contributes 
to his or her injury or creates a serious risk of harm to others.  For example, if 
  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 93. Id. at 610 n.4. 
 94. Id. at 610. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See id. at 610-11. 
 98. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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a plaintiff such as the one in Cantrell chooses to drive a motorcycle without a 
helmet or refrain from wearing a seat belt in a car, such actions create unrea-
sonable risks of harm that should bear on the comparative reprehensibility of 
a defendant’s conduct.99  If a plaintiff has engaged in reckless behavior creat-
ing a risk of harm to others, such as operating a vehicle while intoxicated, 
there is a compelling public policy argument that such conduct should simi-
larly be compared with that of a defendant so as to not ignore, or even worse 
reward, the wrongful behavior.100  Public policy should encourage all parties 
to exercise due care at all times and be held accountable for their negligent, 
reckless, or intentional actions, and prevent windfalls to either party by virtue 
of the happenstance of another.  Yet, by viewing punitive damages independ-
ently of comparative fault, courts focus only on the “bad acts” of one party – 
the defendant – and, therefore, place the defendant at risk of over-
punishment. 
Dismissing such injustice because the underlying purpose of punitive 
awards differs from compensatory awards, or some other technical justifica-
tion, masks the more basic public policy goal of “equal justice under law.”101  
For instance, the argument that punitive damages must be assessed independ-
ently of comparative fault principles because a defendant’s wealth may be a 
factor in awarding them is simply a red herring.102  Juries may take into ac-
count a defendant’s wealth in setting and awarding punitive damages, but 
doing so does not permit them to award disproportionate punishment.103  Ra-
ther, a higher total punitive damage judgment against a wealthy defendant can 
achieve the policy goal of punishment and deterrence; the “appropriate” 
amount of such punishment and deterrence would be based upon the defen-
dant’s proportionate culpability for causing the harm.104  A defendant’s 
  
 99. See Steven B. Hantler, Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Emily J. Laird, 
Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 31-35 (2005) 
(discussing whether juries should be informed of a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat 
belt). 
 100. See id. at 37-40 (discussing whether juries should be informed of a plaintiff’s 
alcohol and illegal drug use, speeding or sleeping in a motor vehicle accident). 
 101. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (“The concept of 
equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, 
as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 102. See, e.g., Jordan H. Leibman, Comparative Contribution and Intentional 
Torts: A Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 677, 
680 n.6 (1993) (stating “[l]ogically, punitive damages would be assessed independ-
ently of comparative fault principles, because the wealth of the defendant is a factor”). 
 103. See BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (stating that the wealth of 
a defendant “provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards,” but that “this factor 
cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as ‘reprehensibility’”). 
 104. See Schwartz, Comparative Fault and Punitive Damages, supra note 12, at 
131-32. 
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wealth merely helps to establish a benchmark for the amount of punishment 
that is not excessive and is proportionate to the harm caused.105  
A related argument that has been advanced is that any reduction of puni-
tive damages would reduce the deterrent effect of a punitive award and thus 
gives parties greater incentive to engage in grossly negligent or intentional 
misconduct.106  Such an argument posits that if a defendant’s reckless or will-
ful contribution to a harm is very modest, for example only 1%, the deterrent 
effect would be effectively lost through the application of comparative 
fault.107  Consequently, some defendants would have a greater incentive to 
engage in wrongful acts or not adequately safeguard against harms. 
Such a viewpoint also holds some superficial appeal, but ignores the 
larger issue of whether the law is justly treating the parties for harm that has 
actually been caused.108  If a party bears only a small percentage of fault for 
an injury, yet punitive damages are warranted when considering the reprehen-
sibility of the conduct making up that small percentage, fundamental fairness 
requires that the party not be disproportionately punished.109  This notion of 
fairness is why courts have gradually shifted to apportionment of punitive 
damages among multiple tortfeasors and apportionment of damages among 
  
 105. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (“Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor 
person more than a wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of this factor to the 
State’s interest in retribution (though not necessarily to its interest in deterrence, given 
the more distant relation between a defendant’s wealth and its responses to economic 
incentives).”). 
 106. As the New Jersey Supreme Court in Blazovic observed: 
Apportionment of fault between intentional 
and negligent parties will not eliminate the de-
terrent or punitive aspects of tort recovery.  
Where tortious conduct merits punitive as well 
as compensatory damages, a plaintiff's com-
parative fault will reduce recovery only of 
compensatory damages.  Because punitive 
damages are designed to punish the wrong-
doer, and not to compensate the injured party, 
they can neither be apportioned nor subject to 
contribution among joint tortfeasors.  That 
principle will accomplish the goal of equitably 
dividing liability for a plaintiff’s compensatory 
damages, while keeping intact the policy of 
punishing wanton or intentional acts. 
Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231-32 (N.J. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 107. See id. at 231. 
 108. See Schwartz, Comparative Fault and Punitive Damages, supra note 12, at 
133 (“Deterrence against wrongful conduct works both ways, and the law should 
apply it both ways.”). 
 109. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.  
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negligent and intentional tortfeasors.110  In addition, and as explained in 
greater detail in the next section, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
fashioned guidelines on the limits of punitive damages specifically to prevent 
disproportionate punitive awards.111  These criteria cover the precise situation 
where compensatory damages are modest in amount and a punitive award is 
many times greater, yet still constitutionally valid.112   
Further, as a practical matter, the party committing wrongful conduct 
warranting punitive damages is unlikely to have an incentive to act recklessly 
or irresponsibly in the future.  As courts and commentators have repeatedly 
appreciated, any punitive damages award can invoke a specter of impropriety 
about a defendant, regardless of size, stature, or wealth.113  This shroud of 
impropriety can adversely impact a defendant in ways beyond the payment of 
the punitive award, including damaging relations within a community and 
impairing the defendant’s ability to earn a livelihood.114  Also, if the conduct 
giving rise to the punitive award is pervasive, such as punitive damages aris-
ing from the selling of a product or providing of services, the defendant may 
be subject to multiple punitive damage awards in other litigation, adding to 
the deterrent effect.115   
  
 110. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 111. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 112. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 113. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that 
does not accompany a purely compensatory award.  The punitive character of punitive 
damages means that there is more than just money at stake.”); Browning-Ferris In-
dus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan and Marshall, 
J.J., concurring) (stating that punitive damages can have “potentially devastating” 
ramifications); Indus. Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812, 837 
(Ala. 1988) (“Although not imposing the stigma of crime or the unique burdens of 
imprisonment, punitive damages nonetheless serve to place the defendant on notice 
that it has engaged in conduct considered intolerable by society and also serves to 
deter others from following the defendant’s example.”). 
 114. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54-55; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. 
Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse 
Bifurcation” Approach to Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 388 (2008) 
[hereinafter Schwartz & Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse] (“Like many 
forms of punishment, punitive damages are designed to ‘engender adverse social 
consequences’ including, in many instances, debilitating stigma.” (quoting Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979))); Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal 
Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 109, 126 (2008) (“Punitive damages, like criminal sanctions, also carry a stig-
ma.”). 
 115. As one commentator wrote: “A single design error, inadequate warning or 
recurrent manufacturing mistake can permeate an entire product line, resulting in tens, 
hundreds or thousands of personal injury lawsuits with accompanying punitive dam-
ages claims.  Individual awards that appear reasonable can aggregate to threaten the 
very survival of a business entity.”  Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass 
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Finally, it is noteworthy that there is no empirical evidence suggesting 
that a reduction in punitive damages to account for comparative fault would 
impair the deterrent effect of punitive damages.  Several states, for example, 
do not allow punitive damages, and there is no evidence suggesting that the 
conduct of either interstate or intrastate defendants is any more egregious or 
reprehensible in these jurisdictions.116  Thus, the analogous argument that the 
application of comparative fault to punitive damages would destroy the deter-
rent effect of punitive damages is spurious.  To the contrary, comparative 
fault would help courts more accurately and fairly allocate punishment to 
responsible parties and reduce reliance on ambiguous standards for how puni-
tive damages are awarded. 
B.  Policy Arguments in Favor of Applying Comparative Fault to Puni-
tive Damage Awards 
Beyond the fundamental fairness policy argument rebutting or overrid-
ing the distinction in purpose of compensatory and punitive damages, there 
are several other policy considerations favoring the application of compara-
tive fault principles to punitive damages.  First, as discussed at the beginning 
of this Article, the imposition of punitive damages has changed dramatically 
since the widespread adoption of comparative fault systems.117  Punitive 
damages are awarded in greater size and frequency and may be supported by 
less culpable conduct than in the past.118  Second, comparative fault appor-
tionment of punitive damages comports with the United States Supreme 
Court’s gradual case law development seeking to reign in excessive punitive 
  
Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 
FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 51 (1983); see also DOBBS, supra note 82, § 382, at 1068 (dis-
cussing aggregate imposition of punitive damages); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. 
Behrens & Lori Bean, Multiple Imposition of Punitive Damages: The Case for 
Reform 3-4 (Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working Pa-
per Series No. 61, 1995).   
 116. Nebraska, for example, completely bars punitive damages, and Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Washington, New Hampshire, Michigan, and Connecticut generally 
do not allow punitive damages, except in very limited circumstances.  See Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495 (2008) (surveying state law); PRODUCT 
LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE - A FIFTY-STATE COMPENDIUM (Morton Daller ed., 
2008); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §78, at 279 
(1935) (listing Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington as rejecting the 
common law doctrine of punitive damages).  Some commentators have also argued 
against the imposition of punitive damages.  See Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doc-
trine Which Should Be Abolished, in DEF. RESEARCH INST., INC., THE CASE AGAINST 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (1969). 
 117. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 20.02, at 454 (discussing decisions allowing punitive 
damages to be awarded for unintentional conduct). 
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damage awards and introduce greater consistency and fairness for how such 
awards are determined.119  Third, applying comparative fault to punitive dam-
age awards would further several positive public policy outcomes, including 
the reduction of wasteful litigation, fair notice to parties of potential liability 
exposure, and the more complete fulfillment of the objectives of statutory 
limits on punitive damages or other civil justice reforms.    
1.  Punitive Damages:  Then and Now 
For most courts and legislatures around the country, the debate and ma-
jor shift from a contributory negligence system to a comparative fault system 
began during the 1960s.120  Treatment of punitive damages did not figure 
prominently in this debate because such awards were relatively uncommon 
and generally modest in amount.121  They were reserved for only the most 
egregious intentional acts.122  Hence, punitive damages were, at best, an after-
thought to how a new comparative fault system would impact longstanding 
legal claims, defenses, and doctrine that had been part of America since its 
founding.123  This effect can be seen by examining the history and develop-
ment of punitive damages in America.  
Punitive damages were first recognized by the English common law in 
the mid-eighteenth century in cases involving illegal searches and seizures by 
officers of the Crown.124  When incorporated into American law, punitive 
damages were available only in a narrow category of torts involving con-
scious and intentional harm inflicted by one person on another.125  Punitive 
damages provided an auxiliary or “helper” to the criminal law system, which 
  
 119. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 120. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 9,  § 67, at 471 
(“[B]y the mid-1960s only seven states had replaced contributory negligence with 
comparative fault, several states switched over in 1969, and the 1970s and early 1980s 
witnessed a surge of legislative and judicial action accomplishing the switch.”). 
 121. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1982) (stating that early awards of punitive damages were “rarely assessed and likely 
to be small in amount”). 
 122. See Schwartz & Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse, supra note 114, at 
388 (“Until the mid-twentieth century, punitive damages were available only for a 
relatively small group of torts involving conscious and intentional harm inflicted by 
one person on another.”); PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, supra note 82, at 
550-51. 
 123. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.   
 124. See Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.); Wilkes v. Wood, 
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
 125. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: 
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 
(1999). 
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in its infancy “punished more severely for infractions involving property 
damage than for invasions of personal rights.”126   
When first awarded, punitive damages were also firmly rooted in a 
compensatory purpose, providing a coherent standard for jury consideration 
and appellate review for excessiveness.127  They were used to compensate 
plaintiffs for intangible losses that were not recoverable under the common 
law.128  Whether termed “vindictive, exemplary, or punitive damages,” such 
awards were considered so integral to compensation that permitting a jury to 
reach “another separate sum . . . for the sake of punishment” was considered a 
reversible error.129  In 1885, for example, the Texas Supreme Court recog-
nized that “[i]t may be, and is, most likely, true that the whole doctrine of 
punitory or exemplary damages has its foundation . . . upon which compensa-
tion may be given many things which ought to be classed as injuries entitling 
the injured person to compensation.”130   
By the turn of the twentieth century, American punitive damages had 
evolved to become vehicles for civil punishment in the majority of courts.131  
  
 126. James B. Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability 
Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351, 355 (1983); see 
also Samuel Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 7 
(1935); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Challenging the Constitutionality of 
Punitive Damages: Putting Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 485, 485-86 (1990); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Dam-
ages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 371 (1965). 
 127. As a law review article of the time recognized, “[t]he difficulty of estimating 
compensation for intangible injuries, was the cause of the rise of this doctrine . . . . 
[W]hen the early judges allowed the jury discretion to assess beyond the pecuniary 
damage, there being no apparent computation, it was natural to suppose that the ex-
cess was imposed as punishment.”  Edward C. Eliot, Exemplary Damages, 29 AM. L. 
REG. 570, 572 (1881) (presently entitled U. PA. L. REV.) (emphasis in original); see 
also Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 
(1957) (citing cases of battery, illegal search, and seduction to find that “[i]n the 
1760’s some courts began to explain large verdicts awarded by juries in aggravated 
cases as compensation to the plaintiff for mental suffering, wounded dignity, and 
injured feelings”). 
 128. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive 
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 614-
15 (2003).  Professor Colby documents that prominent scholars of the time, such as 
Harvard Law School’s Simon Greanleaf, and some courts viewed exemplary damages 
as wholly compensatory in nature, despite their name.  Id. at 617-18 (citing 2 SIMON 
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 240 n.2 (16th ed. 1899); 
Simon Greenleaf, The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 5 W.L.J. 289, 290-96 
(1848); Stillson v. Gibbs, 18 N.W. 815, 817 (Mich. 1884); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 
342, 379-84 (N.H. 1872)). 
 129. Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 462-64 (N.H. 1876). 
 130. Stuart v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885). 
 131. See, e.g., ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES: A HANDBOOK FOR 
THE USE OF STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 86-87 (1896) (outlining objections to the 
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Yet, as late as the 1930s, some courts continued to limit punitive damages to 
compensatory purposes.132  Whether punitive damages were to be constrained 
to compensatory purposes or allowed for punishment was, at one time, the 
subject of vigorous scholarly debate.133  Ultimately, however, the current 
view of punitive damages as punishment prevailed and “the original compen-
satory function of exemplary damages came to be filled by actual damages, 
and courts today are led to speak of exemplary damages exclusively in terms 
of punishment and deterrence.”134  
It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that courts began to depart fur-
ther from the historical moorings of punitive damages and the “intentional 
tort” requirement.135  In what has been called an American “tort revolu-
tion,”136 courts began awarding punitive damages in so-called “mass tort liti-
  
use of exemplary damages as punishment and finding that they had not generally 
prevailed). 
 132. See, e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (Conn. 1930) (finding that 
the purpose of exemplary damages is “not to punish the defendant for his offense but 
to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and so-called punitive or exemplary dam-
ages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s expenses of litigation, less taxable 
costs”); see also Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922) (recognizing that 
exemplary damages “may enlarge the compensatory allowance, but they are not to be 
considered as authorizing a separate sum by way of example or punishment”). 
 133. Compare Theodore Sedgwick, The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto 
(1847) (supporting use of punitive damages as punishment), with Simon Greenleaf, 
The Rule of Damages Ex Delicto (1847) (finding that damages in any civil lawsuit are 
limited to “compensation for some injury sustained”), reprinted in 1 THEODORE 
SEDGWICK, TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF PECUNIARY COMPENSATION AWARDED 
BY COURTS OF JUSTICE 654-72 (3d ed. 1858). 
 134. Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 127, at 520.  As the 
Supreme Court in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. explained: 
Until well into the nineteenth century, punitive 
damages frequently operated to compensate 
for intangible injuries, compensation which 
was not otherwise available under the narrow 
conception of compensatory damages preva-
lent at the time.  As the types of compensatory 
damages available to plaintiffs have broad-
ened, the theory behind punitive damages has 
shifted toward a more purely punitive . . . un-
derstanding. 
532 U.S. 424, 438 n.11 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 135. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also PROSSER, WADE AND 
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, supra note 82, at 554. 
 136. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 129 (1988). 
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gation,” particularly in the developing field of product liability.137  While 
punitive damages remained available in the traditional one-on-one context for 
a defendant’s intentional wrong to a specific plaintiff, the base for awarding 
them was broadly expanded to cover conduct that was not intentional in na-
ture.  For example, punitive damages became readily available in some states 
for conduct viewed as reckless, willful and wanton, or grossly negligent.138 
The focus of punitive damages also shifted away from conduct solely di-
rected toward an actual plaintiff to alleged wrongful conduct by a defendant 
toward the public at large.139  For example, while it was difficult to prove that 
a manufacturer marketed and sold a defective product with the conscious 
intent of injuring a specific plaintiff, it was easier to establish that the defen-
dant did so “recklessly” in disregard to the possible harm to potential con-
sumers.140  Similarly, in insurance and other contract cases, courts began to 
  
 137. In 1967, a California appellate court held for the first time that punitive dam-
ages were recoverable in a strict product liability action.  See Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 711-13, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).  Since then, 
punitive damages awards in product liability cases have proliferated. 
 138. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 139. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska 1979) 
(punitive damages available where manufacturer has marketed known defective prod-
uct in “reckless disregard of the public’s safety”), modified on other grounds, 615 
P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980); Madisons Chevrolet, Inc., v. Donald, 505 P.2d 1032, 1042 
(Ariz. 1973) (“[P]unitive damages . . . are applicable where there is a ‘reckless indif-
ference to the interest of others’”); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 
382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (interpreting statutory term “malice” to encompass “callous 
and conscious disregard of public safety” by manufacturer of defective product); 
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 648-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (plaintiffs were 
properly allowed to argue that defendant had been “guilty of gross disregard of the 
rights of the public”), aff’d, 263 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson 
Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1980) (manufacturer “acted in reckless disregard 
of the public” in marketing non-flame retardant children’s pajamas); Wangen v. Ford 
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Wis. 1980) (“Some commentators speak of the 
behavior justifying punitive damages as ‘flagrant indifference to the public safety.’” 
(quoting 5 U.S. OF DEP’T COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., 
PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 137 (1977))); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979) (“Reckless indifference to the 
rights of others and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them . . . may provide 
the necessary state of mind to justify punitive damages.”). 
 140. In Toole, the first case to find that punitive damages were recoverable in a 
strict product liability action, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the plaintiff 
was not required to prove that the defendant pharmaceutical company acted with 
deliberate intent to injure the plaintiff.  251 Cal. App. 2d at 713-14.  Rather, the mal-
ice in fact standard in California’s punitive damages statute applied, and the plaintiff 
merely had to prove that the defendant acted recklessly and in wanton disregard to the 
possible harm to others when it marketed, promoted, and sold the anti-cholesterol 
drug at issue.  See id. at 715. 
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allow punitive damage awards in relation to acts of “bad faith,”141 further 
broadening the scope of punitive damages while diluting the standard for 
awarding them.142   
As a result of these developments, the size and frequency of punitive 
damage awards “increased dramatically.”143  While traditionally punitive 
damage awards were comparably sized to the compensatory award, these 
punitive amounts exploded in the 1970s and 1980s.144  In addition, “unprece-
dented numbers of punitive awards in product liability and other mass tort 
situations began to surface.”145  For example, before 1976, there were only 
  
 141. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Common-Sense Construc-
tion of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1483-86 (2009) (discussing the development of insurance bad 
faith actions at common law); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 
62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Unheard of only 30 years ago, bad faith contract ac-
tions now account for a substantial percentage of all punitive damages awards.”). 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965), cmt. f, recognizes that 
“[r]eckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important par-
ticular”: 
While an act to be reckless must be intended 
by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause 
the harm which results from it.  It is enough 
that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, 
should realize that there is a strong probability 
that harm may result, even though he hopes or 
even expects that his conduct will prove harm-
less.  However, a strong probability is a differ-
ent thing from the substantial certainty without 
which he cannot be said to intend the harm in 
which his act results. 
 143. George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 123, 123 (1982); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the 
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1982) 
(“Punitive damages are in the air, are on the move.  They are now dramatically 
awarded in cases in which liability of any sort would have been almost out of the 
question merely fifteen years ago.”).  Ford Motor Company, for example, reported 
that less than 0.5% of the products liability complaints filed against it prior to 1970 
contained claims for punitive damages, while 27.1% of all such complaints in 1980 
sought punitive awards.  See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Dam-
ages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 54 n.258 
(1982).  If only personal injury lawsuits are considered, the 1980 percentage is higher.  
See id. 
 144. See BLATT ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.2, at 5 (1991) (“[G]enerally before 1955, 
even if punitive damages were awarded, the size of the punitive damage award in 
relation to the compensatory damage award was relatively small, as even nominal 
punitive damages were considered to be punishment in and of themselves.”). 
 145. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986); see also HUBER, supra note 136, at 127; 
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 6 (1991). 
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three reported appellate court decisions upholding awards of punitive dam-
ages in product liability cases, and the punitive damages awards in each case 
were modest in proportion to the compensatory damages awarded.146  By 
1991, the rise in the size and frequency of punitive damage awards led the 
Supreme Court to conclude that punitive damages had “run wild” in this 
country.147  As commentators at the time further recognized, “hardly a month 
goes by without a multi-million dollar punitive damages verdict . . . .”148 
Thus, the environment in which courts and legislatures initially failed to 
address the treatment of punitive damages within a comparative fault system 
is radically different than it is today.149  This difference demonstrates the im-
  
 146. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 104, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) 
($125,000 compensatory damages, $50,000 attorneys’ fees, $100,000 punitive dam-
ages); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 689, 693-94 
($175,000 compensatory, $250,000 punitive damages); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 
N.E.2d 636, 638, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ($920,000 compensatory damages, $10,000 
punitive damages), aff’d, 263 N.E.2d 103 (lll. 1970). 
 147. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). 
 148. Malcom E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of 
the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 919, 919 (1989), quoted in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
As one scholar further explained: 
In the more than 200 years during which the 
common law of punitive damages has evolved 
in this country, only in the last few decades has 
there been a proliferation of public concerns 
about the manner in which the law has devel-
oped and may continue to develop in the fu-
ture. . . . [R]ecent years have witnessed explo-
sive growth in the evolution of punitive dam-
age law and practice.  This growth manifests 
itself in the number of cases in which punitive 
damages are sought; in the variety of causes of 
action in which they are claimed; and in the 
different categories of defendants who are ex-
posed to punitive damage awards. 
2 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE 
§ 21.1 (2d ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 149. Learned Judge Henry Friendly predicted the potential problems of the new 
expansion of punitive damages law when he wrote in 1967 that,  
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for 
punitive damages on the part of hundreds of 
plaintiffs are staggering . . . . We have the 
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for 
punitive damages in such a multiplicity of ac-
tions throughout the nation can be so adminis-
tered as to avoid overkill. 
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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portance of a careful consideration of whether and how comparative fault 
principles may apply to punitive awards, and the need for some courts to re-
examine this issue in light of these and other developments with regard to 
comparative fault principles over the past half-century.150      
2.  The Supreme Court’s Effort to Reign In Punitive Damages 
The dramatic rise in the size and frequency of punitive damage awards, 
coupled with the erosion in standards to allow such awards for unintended 
conduct, has led the Supreme Court of the United States to closely examine 
the issue of disproportionate and unjustified punitive awards.  The Supreme 
Court has done so by imposing constitutional limitations on the excessiveness 
of punitive damage awards; a responsive measure directed at the same public 
policy goal of curbing disproportionate punishment as the application of 
comparative fault to punitive damages.   
In 1991, when the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Haslip recognized that punitive damages awards had “run 
wild” in this country, the Court indicated that punitive damages are subject to 
constitutional due process limitations.151  The Court rooted its decision in the 
adequacy of procedural protections, finding that the appellate review proce-
dures in the case “impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint 
on the discretion of [the jury] in awarding punitive damages.”152  Soon after, 
in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,153 a plurality of the 
Supreme Court moved the discussion into the realm of substantive due proc-
ess limits on punitive damages.  The Court declined to adopt a bright-line test 
for the substantive amount of a punitive award, but made clear that “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits 
‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”154  The Court then returned in Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg,155 to consider the procedural issue of whether a state 
must provide judicial review of the amount of a punitive damages award, 
finding that due process requires judicial review of the size of a punitive 
damages award.   
In 1996, the Court in BMW of North America v. Gore156 examined the 
open question in TXO to provide guidance on how to determine whether the 
  
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
 151. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1; see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989) (holding that Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damages, yet stating in dicta that 
“[t]here is some authority in [the Court’s] opinions for the view that the Due Process 
Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award”). 
 152. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20, 22. 
 153. 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993). 
 154. Id. at 453-56. 
 155. 512 U.S. 415, 420, 432 (1994). 
 156. 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 568 (1996). 
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size of a punitive damage award falls outside the limits of due process.  In 
Gore, the plaintiff, who purchased a new BMW sedan, experienced $4000 in 
compensatory damages related to the unauthorized repainting of his car dur-
ing detailing by the distributor.157  An Alabama jury returned a $4 million 
punitive damages verdict, which was later reduced to $2 million by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court.158  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided that the $2 million award still left a punishment that exceeded Ala-
bama’s legitimate interests in protecting the rights of its citizens because it 
relied on out-of-state conduct, and was, therefore, unconstitutionally exces-
sive.159   
In Gore, the Court also provided three “guideposts” for determining 
whether a punitive damages award is “unconstitutionally excessive.”160  
These guideposts include (1) the “degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct,”161 (2) the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages,162 and 
(3) a comparison to “civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct.”163  These comparisons of actual damages and puni-
tive damages, and of other similar penalties, serve the same purpose as the 
application of comparative fault principles to a punitive award.  Both are de-
signed to “prohibit[] a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment 
on a tortfeasor”164 and ensure that “a person receive[s] fair notice not only of 
the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the 
penalty that a State may impose.”165   
The Court clarified the Gore factors in subsequent cases.  In Cooper In-
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc.,166 the Court stated that lower 
courts must consider all three Gore factors when reviewing a punitive dam-
ages award for excessiveness and do so through de novo review.  Then, in 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,167 the Court re-
fined these due process factors, instructing courts that the “most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of 
  
 157. See id. at 563-64.  The jury apparently calculated the $4 million punitive 
damage award by multiplying the plaintiff’s damage estimate ($4000) by 1000, the 
number of cars BMW allegedly sold throughout the country under its nondisclosure 
policy.  See id. at 564. 
 158. Id. at 565, 567.                          
 159. Id. at 585-86. 
 160. Id. at 568, 574-75. 
 161. Id. at 575. 
 162. Id. at 580. 
 163. Id. at 583. 
 164. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
454 (1993)). 
 165. Id. at 574. 
 166. 532 U.S. 424, 431, 440 (2001). 
 167. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”168  The Court also declined once 
again to create a “bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot 
exceed,” but indicated that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will sat-
isfy due process.”169  The Court noted that in exceptional cases a higher ratio 
may be justified where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.”170  The Court, however, observed that 
“[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps 
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
process guarantee.”171  The Court also reminded lower courts that the “wealth 
of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages 
award,” such that it would allow an otherwise impermissible ratio.172 
This line of Supreme Court decisions continued in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams,173 where the Court explained that juries can consider the harm to 
others in assessing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, but courts 
must adequately instruct the jury that it cannot punish the defendant specifi-
cally for harm done to others.174  Rather, the basis for meting out punishment 
is limited only to harm caused to the particular plaintiff before the court.   
These decisions by the Supreme Court show a methodical effort to de-
velop consistent and effective rules to mete out fair, non-excessive punitive 
damage awards.175  The application of comparative fault to punitive damages 
furthers this policy goal.  It curbs disproportionate and excessive awards by 
tethering the award to parties’ actual responsibility for the harm and adds 
greater predictability and fair notice to parties of potential liability.  These are 
stated goals of the Supreme Court in developing the law with regard to puni-
tive damages over the past twenty-five years.   
  
 168. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 169. Id. at 425. 
 170. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 427. 
 173. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 174. Id. at 353 (“[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a 
punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonpar-
ties or those whom they directly represent . . . .”). 
 175. The Supreme Court has also analyzed the imposition of punitive damages 
from a common law perspective.  See Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christo-
pher E. Appel, The Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive 
Damage Awards: A Guide for the Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 881, 
884-91 (2009) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding punitive damages 
in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)). 
29
Schwartz and Appel: Schwartz: Two Wrongs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: SchwartzAppelPaginated.doc Created on:  10/21/13 9:40 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
162 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
3.  Comparative Fault Apportionment of Punitive Damage Awards 
Would Improve the Overall Justice System 
A final public policy consideration in evaluating whether to apply com-
parative fault principles to awards of punitive damages is what this adoption 
would mean for the justice system as a whole.  In addition to improving fun-
damental fairness in the system by directly tying punitive awards to a parties’ 
actual contribution to a harm, the application of comparative fault to punitive 
damages could produce other benefits as well.  First, it could reduce wasteful 
litigation whereby parties routinely challenge an amount of punitive damages 
as excessive and grossly disproportionate to the compensatory award.  Liti-
gants today often rely on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for challenging 
such awards; comparative fault apportionment could curb these challenges, 
or, if challenged, encourage settlement by providing parties with less ambigu-
ity in how the award will be evaluated on judicial review.  Either of these 
results could reduce costs to all parties and free up limited judicial resources.   
Second, in addition to the fairness and due process considerations in 
curbing excessive punitive awards, comparative fault apportionment of puni-
tive damages could provide parties with improved notice of their potential 
liability exposure.  This notice helps to provide a level playing field for any 
potential litigant by reducing the risk of unfair surprise and catastrophic li-
ability.  It could also facilitate settlement by giving parties’ a better under-
standing of potential punitive damages award amounts.  Further, the public 
policy supporting such notice is particularly compelling in modern times 
where a party may not act intentionally to contribute to a harm, but neverthe-
less be subjected to punitive damages, possibly through multiple litigations 
involving the same or similar conduct.176 
Finally, comparative fault apportionment of punitive damages would 
further the public policy goals in many states that have enacted caps or other 
limits on punitive damages.  Roughly one-half of states legislatively limit the 
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded, either generally across all 
actions177 or in select contexts such as products liability or wrongful death.178  
  
 176. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (punitive damages may not exceed compensatory dam-
ages); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (pu-
nitive damages limited to the greater of $250,000 or three times compensatory dam-
ages); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Second Reg. Sess.) 
(punitive damages limited to the greater of three times compensatory damages or 
$50,000); MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265(1) (Supp. 2011) (punitive damages capped at the 
greater of $500,000 or five times the net amount of the judgment awarded to the 
plaintiff against the defendant); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (West, Westlaw 
through 2011) (punitive damage award may not exceed $10 million or 3% of a defen-
dant’s net worth, whichever is less). 
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They have largely done so for the same reasons articulated by the Supreme 
Court, namely the dramatic increase in the size and frequency of punitive 
damages over the past several decades and the lack of clear standards in 
awarding them.179  Yet caps focus solely on the total amount of punishment 
awarded; they do not focus on the particular wrongdoing of a plaintiff.180  
This conduct should also be considered in determining punitive damages 
because often a plaintiff’s conduct can cause significant risk of harm to oth-
ers.  It is unsound public policy to allow plaintiffs who are reckless in causing 
injury to themselves or third parties to recover the full amount of a punitive 
award, regardless of whether that amount is limited by a legislatively deter-
mined maximum amount of punishment.  
On balance, the public policy benefits of applying comparative fault 
principles to punitive damage awards should outweigh the perceived short-
comings.  While compensatory and punitive damages support distinct policy 
goals – although, as discussed above, this divergence was not always the 
case181 – the larger policy goal of fairness to litigants through proportionate 
punishment is the most compelling.  Comparative fault apportionment of 
punitive awards also fits more neatly with the evolution and expansion of 
punitive damages to include unintentional conduct and the Supreme Court’s 
stated policy goals regarding punitive damages.182  As the next section will 
discuss, there are several ways courts can include comparative fault principles 
in how punitive damages are awarded.   
IV.  PRACTICAL METHODS FOR APPLYING COMPARATIVE FAULT 
PRINCIPLES TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
An important preface to deciding whether and how to apply comparative 
fault apportionment to punitive damage awards is that there is more than one 
solution.  Courts and legislatures can incorporate comparative fault in differ-
ent ways based on how their states’ comparative fault system works.  Greater 
implementation options also allow for incremental development in states that 
are seeking to more fairly mete out punishment but are cautious about adopt-
ing strict, across the board application of comparative fault to punitive dam-
ages.  Accordingly, this section offers three general approaches for courts and 
legislatures to consider.    
  
 178. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. 
Sess.) (punitive damages in product liability actions limited to two times compensa-
tory damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (2012) (punitive damages 
in wrongful death actions limited to $250,000). 
 179. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 506-09 (discussing states’ efforts to legislatively limit 
punitive damages).  
 180. See id. at 511 (recognizing that limits on ratios of punitive damages to com-
pensatory damages reflect a “legislative judgment” of a “reasonable limit overall”). 
 181. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra Parts III.B.1-2. 
31
Schwartz and Appel: Schwartz: Two Wrongs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: SchwartzAppelPaginated.doc Created on:  10/21/13 9:40 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
164 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
A.  Punitive Damages Apportionment Based Upon Pure Comparative 
Fault 
The simplest and most straightforward application of comparative fault 
principles to punitive damages is where these awards are treated the same as 
compensatory damages.  For instance, in a pure comparative fault system 
where each tortfeasor is assigned a percentage of fault and pays that percent-
age of the total compensatory award, the tortfeasor’s punitive award would 
likewise be limited to the tortfeasor’s percentage of fault.183  A numerical 
illustration would be where a jury finds that four defendant tortfeasors wrong-
fully caused an injury for which each is 25% responsible: if the jury awards 
$10,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages, each 
defendant tortfeasor must pay $2500 in compensatory damages and $5000 in 
punitive damages.  
The benefit of such a system, aside from its simplicity, is that each party 
pays its fair share to compensate for the harm actually caused and for the 
penalty associated with that harm.184  Where the plaintiff bears some respon-
sibility for his or her injury, this measure of comparative fault would also be 
reflected through a reduction in both a defendant’s compensatory and puni-
tive damages award.  Similarly, if punitive damages were assessed against 
some, but not all, of the defendants, each defendant would still only pay that 
percentage of compensatory and punitive damages for the harm they indi-
vidually caused.   
This approach is also readily compatible with a modified comparative 
fault system, which most states adopt.185  The same direct application of 
  
 183. Cf. Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-Or-
Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and De-
fendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 122-24 (1993) (arguing that comparative 
fault principles should be applied in certain intentional tort cases as a matter of fair-
ness). 
 184. Cf. Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp., Inc., 953 P.2d 722, 731 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) 
(“Punitive damages are personal to the wrongdoer, and imply nothing with regard to 
the liability of or damages owed by other defendants.”). 
 185. As one recent survey states: 
[I]n the United States, five states adopt the 
contributory negligence rule, which com-
pletely bars a plaintiff from getting damage 
compensation even if the plaintiff has slight 
negligence. Thirty-three states adopt the 
“modified” comparative negligence rule, 
which completely bars a plaintiff from recov-
ery if the plaintiff’s negligence is larger than 
the defendant’s fault.  The remaining states 
adopt the “pure” comparative negligence rule, 
which awards a plaintiff damage compensation 
according to her relative fault.   
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comparative fault would apply, presuming the claim itself may be brought.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, this simply requires that the plaintiff is not 
more than 50% or 51% at fault for his or her injury.186  Hence, the approach, 
adapted to either a comparative fault or modified comparative fault system, 
embodies the principles of comparative fault in their most pure and unadul-
terated form.            
B.  Punitive Damages Apportionment Based Upon Degree of Repre-
hensibility of Defendant’s Conduct Given Plaintiff’s Negligent Con-
duct 
A second, more moderate approach to incorporating comparative fault 
principles into awards of punitive damages is to reduce the punitive damages 
to reflect the plaintiff’s fault for his or her injury.  Under this approach, the 
court would take into consideration the plaintiff’s conduct for the exclusive 
purpose of determining whether the defendant’s conduct is less reprehensible, 
and thus deserving of lesser punishment.187  For example, if a defendant man-
ufacturer was grossly negligent in designing a product and a jury awarded 
punitive damages, that amount could be reduced if the plaintiff’s negligence 
increased the total risk of the injury occurring such that the defendant’s con-
duct, when viewed in totality, was less reprehensible.  The classic example 
would be where an automobile accident is alleged to be the result of a manu-
facturing defect and punitive damages are implicated, but the plaintiff con-
tributed to the accident by driving the car under the influence of alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Importantly, this approach is different from directly applying compara-
tive fault apportionment to the punitive damage award in the same manner as 
under a pure comparative fault system.  It would not reduce the amount of 
punitive damages by the percentage of the plaintiff’s fault for the harm re-
quiring compensation, but rather insert a comparative fault analysis of the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct independent of the compensatory 
harm and award.  The reprehensibility of a party’s conduct is, again, 
“[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
  
Xinyu Hua, Product Recall and Liability, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 113, 114 (2011). 
 186. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (applying comparative fault when plaintiff is fifty per cent or more at fault); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-31 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (applying 
comparative fault when plaintiff is 51% or more at fault). 
 187. See generally Leonard Charles Schwartz, The Myth of Nonapportionment 
Between a Plaintiff and a Defendant Under Traditional Tort Law and Its Significance 
for Modern Comparative Fault, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 493, 503-05 (1989) 
(presently entitled U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.) (discussing the development of 
apportionment by both causation of loss and degree of blameworthiness under tort 
law). 
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damages award.”188  Therefore, this approach focuses comparative fault ap-
portionment only on the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct 
in light of the plaintiff’s conduct.  
Building from the example above, if a jury found that a product was de-
fective and the manufacturer was reckless in marketing it, and the jury de-
cided to award punitive damages, that award would be reduced by any culpa-
ble conduct of the plaintiff.  For instance, if the plaintiff misused the product 
in a manner contributing to his or her injury or ignored clear warnings for the 
product’s safe use, that conduct could serve to reduce the punitive award 
against the product manufacturer.  In essence, this approach ensures that an 
award of punitive damages is not arrived at in an isolated manner that only 
examines the defendant’s conduct, but rather, under an analysis that takes into 
account the totality of the circumstances.  As a practical matter, this approach 
would likely be effectuated by a jury instruction stating the conduct of all of 
the parties is to be considered in returning a punitive award. 
In addition, such an approach is moderate in that it is unlikely to signifi-
cantly disturb the determination of punitive damage awards for intentional 
conduct.  Stated plainly, where a tortfeasor intentionally or maliciously caus-
es harm to another, the comparative negligence of the plaintiff is unlikely to 
diminish the comparative reprehensibility of the defendant’s intentional act.  
Therefore, the punitive award would likely be unaffected or only nominally 
reduced.   
Further, because most states do not adopt a pure comparative fault sys-
tem, and instead apply a modified system,189 this option might be a preferred 
“middle ground” choice.  The approach incorporates comparative fault prin-
ciples, yet more indirectly, and can, as a practical matter, leave unaltered 
those punitive damage awards based on the most egregious, intentional mis-
conduct.  Also, when applied to less culpable conduct under a modified com-
parative fault system, it can provide a relatively narrow window since it is 
known that the defendant bears primary responsibility for the injury.  If the 
plaintiff was 50% or 51% or more at fault, depending on the state’s modified 
comparative fault rule, the claim could not be brought in the first place.190   
Moreover, this approach is designed to operate where a plaintiff is less 
than 50% or 51% at fault for his or her injury, yet still significantly contrib-
uted to it, and the injury was not based upon any intentional act by the defen-
dant(s).  In such a limited scenario, a court should instruct a jury to apply 
comparative fault principles in evaluating the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct and adjust a punitive damages award accordingly.   
  
 188. BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Punitive Damages Apportionment Based upon Tortfeasor’s Contri-
bution to Total Punitive Award 
A final way to insert comparative fault principles into the determination 
of a punitive damages award is to apply a separate comparative fault analysis 
to the punitive award.  This approach represents a middle ground option be-
tween the two approaches discussed previously.  Here, a percentage of fault 
would be assigned among each of the parties for their conduct warranting a 
punitive award, making each party responsible only for that proportionate 
amount.  This analysis would be separate from the direct application of com-
parative fault based on the contribution to the compensatory damages; it 
would provide a direct application of comparative fault principles to the rep-
rehensibility of each party’s conduct. 
An illustration helps to explain the differences.  Here, product liability 
again provides a useful illustration because punitive damages may be award-
ed where the defendant manufacturer has not committed an intentional tort.191  
Also, a plaintiff may be culpable in some respect for contributing to his or her 
injury due to a variety of factors, including product misuse or ignoring ade-
quate warnings.  There may also be other defendants involved, some of whom 
share in the blame for the injury and are deserving of punishment, and others 
who do not deserve to be punished despite a significant contribution to the 
total compensatory damages incurred.   
For example, consider a plaintiff, severely injured in an automobile ac-
cident, who sues the automobile manufacturer seeking punitive damages 
claiming the manufacturer was reckless in allowing the product to be mar-
keted and sold with an alleged defect.  If the plaintiff driver was drunk behind 
the wheel at the time of the accident, this grossly negligent or reckless con-
duct would be compared with the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct 
and each party would be assigned a percentage to apply to the total punitive 
award.  Also, if another driver negligently contributed to the accident and was 
a defendant in the case, the reprehensibility of her conduct would be consid-
ered in the same manner. 
In such a scenario, an application of comparative fault to the punitive 
damages award might not necessarily reflect each party’s comparative fault 
for the compensatory harm.  For instance a jury could find that the drunk 
driving plaintiff was 30% at fault, the automobile manufacturer 20% at fault, 
and the other driver 50% at fault for the compensatory damages stemming 
from the accident.  But, that same jury could find that the other driver’s con-
duct, which contributed most to the injury, was merely negligent and unde-
serving of any punitive damages.  Both the plaintiff and automobile manufac-
turer’s conduct, however, could be held to rise to a level of reprehensibility 
deserving of punishment.  In such a scenario, the jury could apportion com-
  
 191. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
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parative fault – which could also be stated as comparative reprehensibility – 
as 60% for the plaintiff, 40% for the manufacturer, and 0% for the other driv-
er.  The manufacturer’s punitive damage award would then be reduced by 
60% or the total comparative reprehensibility of the other parties.  Thus, the 
manufacturer in this hypothetical would end up paying 20% of the compensa-
tory award and 40% of the punitive award.   
While somewhat more complex than the other approaches discussed, 
this option of incorporating comparative fault principles is arguably the most 
precise and consistent with how punitive damages are intended to function.  It 
focuses the comparative fault analysis on the reprehensibility of all parties’ 
conduct and allocates a specific percentage to each.  In doing so, the approach 
recognizes that the reprehensibility of a party’s conduct will not always close-
ly track that party’s contribution to the harm requiring compensation.   
There are undoubtedly other approaches courts could consider to incor-
porate a comparative fault analysis into how punitive damage awards are 
determined.  Because courts have shown reluctance in the past to directly 
acknowledge an intersection between comparative fault and punitive dam-
ages, this Article simply presents three approaches that could be readily 
adapted to a state’s existing comparative fault or modified comparative fault 
system.  Each approach finds support in sound public policy ensuring fairness 
to all litigants and curbing disproportionate punishment, as well as in the 
gradual development of comparative fault principles over the past half-
century.192     
V.  CONCLUSION 
When most states jettisoned contributory negligence in favor of com-
parative fault, there was little occasion to consider the impacts on punitive 
damages.  Rare in occurrence and modest in amount, these awards were de-
pendent upon malicious and intentional acts that did not obviously relate to 
notions of shared responsibility and disproportionate punishment.  This envi-
ronment totally changed as the law of punitive damages totally changed; 
awards increased dramatically in size and frequency and were awarded absent 
any intentional wrongdoing.193  Few courts, however, have taken the oppor-
tunity to reexamine how comparative fault principles can or should intersect 
with punitive damages in this changed environment.194  They can hardly be 
blamed for inaction, as few counsel have endeavored to bring the issue to 
courts’ attention.195   
As this Article has shown, there are sound public policy considerations 
supporting such inclusion, namely the overarching goal of the tort system to 
  
 192. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 193. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 194. See supra Part II.A. 
 195. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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provide fundamental fairness and avoid disproportionate punishment.196  This 
goal is shared by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decisions 
reigning-in disproportionate punitive damage awards, and it can be seen gen-
erally in the development of comparative fault principles to consider the rela-
tive fault of intentional tortfeasors with negligent tortfeasors and among mul-
tiple parties against whom punitive damages are awarded.197  In light of these 
developments over the past half-century, courts should reconsider, or address 
for the first time, whether and how comparative fault principles apply to puni-
tive damage awards.  This Article provides some basic approaches for courts 
to adopt.198  In a truly just system, comparative fault principles cannot be 
segregated from punitive damages forever.  In fashioning legal rules, it must 
also be remembered that deterrence is not a one-way street; plaintiffs who 
create a substantial risk of harm to themselves and others should not be treat-
ed the same way as innocent plaintiffs in cases where punitive damages are 
awarded.  It is finally time for courts to give this issue its due attention.  
 
  
 196. See supra Part III.A. 
 197. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 198. See supra Part IV. 
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